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2 
“There’s a light on in the attic. 
Though the house is dark and shuttered, 
I can see a flickerin’ flutter, 
and I know what it’s about.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has long used scientific data to inform its decision 
making.2 Despite popular beliefs that science and constitutional law are separate and distinct 
fields, the Court’s legal opinions have become increasingly infused with discussions involving 
scientific data.3 Thanks to advances in technology, brain development science has become 
noticeably prominent in the Court’s recent cases involving juveniles; the same is true of amici 
curiae who present such science through their briefs.4 
Part I of this paper provides an overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence on juveniles 
from 1948 through 2004. Part II analyzes five cases since 2005 in which the Court considered 
scientific brain development evidence to guide its determinations of whether children required 
enhanced protections under various areas of the law: Roper v. Simmons,5 Graham v. Florida,6 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina,7 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,8 and Miller v. 
                                            
 
 
1 SHEL SILVERSTEIN, A Light in the Attic, in A LIGHT IN THE ATTIC 7 (1981). 
2 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW (2004). 
3 Anthony Varoudakis, Book Review, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1 (2004–2005) (reviewing DAVID L. FAIGMAN, 
LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
(2004)). 
4 See cases cited infra notes 5–9. 
5 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
6 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
7 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
8 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
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Alabama.9 Part III answers the question, “Which one of these cases is not like the others?” and 
then looks at implications of—and questions left open by—the Court’s recent cases involving 
juveniles. The paper concludes by describing the likely future trajectory of the Supreme Court’s 
use of brain development science in cases involving juveniles. 
I. A LOOK AT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING JUVENILES (1948–2004) 
The five cases discussed in Part II did not occur in a vacuum. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the constitutional significance of childhood since 
the mid-1900s.10 This section offers an overview of Court’s evolving juvenile jurisprudence over 
the five and a half decades preceding its 2005 decision in Roper v. Graham. 
A. Due Process Rights and Miranda: Protecting Juveniles against Coerced Confessions 
The 1948 case of Haley v. Ohio set the scene for later opinions with its recognition that 
children “cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity” expected of adults.11 The 
Court in Haley prohibited the use of a fifteen-year-old’s confession on due process grounds after 
observing that “special care” must be used to evaluate the circumstances surrounding custodial 
interrogation when “a mere child—an easy victim of the law” is involved.12 Noting the boy’s 
“tender and difficult age” and “the period of great instability” produced by “the crisis of 
                                            
 
 
9 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
10 Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 79, 90 (2013). 
11 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1947). 
12 Id. at 599–601. 
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adolescence,” the Court remarked, “[t]hat which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can 
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.”13 
Haley—the Court’s first case intoning that children are constitutionally different from 
adults—touched on two additional concepts that later took root. Justice Frankfurter, concurring 
in the judgment, took the opportunity to espouse his belief that “even capital offenses by boys of 
fifteen should [not] be dealt with according to the conventional criminal procedure.”14 He also 
noted that an inquiry into whether a teenager’s confession is constitutionally sound “depends on 
an evaluation of psychological factors, or, more accurately . . . the persuasive feeling of society 
regarding such psychological factors.”15 Noting the “inherent vagueness” of the required tests, he 
lamented the lack of “available experts on such matters to guide the judicial judgment.”16 Thus, 
Haley foreshadowed both the downfall of the juvenile death penalty and the rise of the Court’s 
reliance on science and amici to bolster society’s “vague” notions of child development. 
Meanwhile, the dissent emphasized another point that would have tremendous impact in the field 
of juvenile justice in the years that followed: “that many felonies are being committed . . . by 
minors and an obligation attaches to law enforcement officials to punish, prevent and discourage 
such conduct by minors as well as by adults.”17 
In 1962, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Haley’s central message about the 
constitutional differences between children and adults in another case involving a teenager’s 
                                            
 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 602–03 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
15 Id. at 605. 
16 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1947). 
17 Id. at 614 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
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confession.18 In Gallegos v. Colorado, the Court reiterated that “the youth of the accused” was 
one relevant factor in evaluating the totality of circumstances surrounding whether a statement 
was obtained through coercion, and thus a violation of due process.19 Emphasizing that a 
fourteen-year-old “cannot be compared to an adult in full possession of his senses and 
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions,” the Court held that to uphold the boy’s 
conviction “would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional rights.”20 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Douglas—who also delivered the opinion in Haley—emphasized a critical 
element at the core of the Court’s jurisprudence involving juveniles: a need for “adult 
protection.”21 “A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the 
protection which his own immaturity could not,” Douglas wrote. Without such adult guidance, 
he concluded, “a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, [his] constitutional 
rights.”22 
Four years later came Miranda v. Arizona,23 a case that “drastically changed the 
landscape of confession suppression jurisprudence.”24 In order to protect the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination in light of the inherent compulsion of custodial 
interrogations, Miranda established that police must give certain warnings to notify an in-
                                            
 
 
18 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
19 Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 52. 
20 Id. at 54–55. Three justices dissented on the facts, finding none of the offending aspects of Haley’s interrogation 
present during Gallegos’ questioning, aside from the boy’s status as a juvenile. Id. at 63. The dissent emphasized 
that “Haley does not indicate that youth alone is sufficient to render a juvenile’s confession inadmissible.” Id. at 64. 
21 Id. at 54. 
22 Id. 
23 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). 
24 Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law, 38 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 120 (2012). 
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custody suspect of his rights before proceeding with questioning.25 Despite Haley, Gallegos, and 
Miranda, juvenile courts continued to adhere to informal practices that eschewed many of the 
procedural protections available to adult criminal defendants.26 This discrepancy was rooted in 
the belief that children, unlike adults, have rights “not to liberty but to custody” and that the 
state’s main role as parens patriae was to provide such custody for delinquent youth.27 
This changed in 1967 with In re Gault.28 The Court in Gault made it clear that the state’s 
role “to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness,”29 and 
reiterated that due process indeed was required in juvenile court proceedings.30 Repeating the 
concerns surrounding juvenile confessions that were present in Haley and Gallagos, the Court 
remarked that “[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were 
available to hardened criminals but not to children.”31 Thus, the Court concluded, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to juveniles, as it does to adults.”32 
Recognizing that waiver of the privilege by children may present “special problems,” the Court 
stated that “differences in technique—but not in principle” may occur based on the child’s age, 
and that the “greatest care” is required to ensure the voluntariness of juvenile admissions.33 
                                            
 
 
25 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Specifically, police must warn the suspect “that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and 
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him . . . .” Id. at 479. 
26 Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 24, at 128. 
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). 
28 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
29 Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)). 
30 Id.at 30–31. 
31 Id. at 45–47. 
32 Id. at 55. 
33 Id. 
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Another twelve years passed before the Supreme Court decided its first Miranda case 
involving a juvenile.34 In Fare v. Michael C., the Court held that the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach used to determine whether an adult knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his Miranda rights is “adequate . . . even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.”35 The 
approach was appropriate, said the Court, because it already incorporated a look at all relevant 
factors, including “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and  
. . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”36 
Perhaps in response to Fare and a series of empirical studies about juveniles’ ability to 
understand and competence to waive Miranda warnings, advocates increasingly turned to social 
science data to support their push for heightened protection of youthful defendants’ rights.37 
Such data strengthened the case for treating youth as “a significant factor in assessing 
voluntariness for due process and Miranda purposes . . . and for finding that youth below a 
certain age are unable to make a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver” of rights.38 
The Court heard its next case involving juvenile confessions two and a half decades 
later.39 This underlying issue in Yarborough v. Alvarado was whether a court must consider a 
juvenile’s age in determining if he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.40 Justice Kennedy 
delivered the Court’s opinion, noting that the relevant test was whether, given the circumstances, 
                                            
 
 
34 Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 24, at 134. 
35 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). 
36 Id. at 725. 
37Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 24, at 137–39. 
38Id. at 140. 
39 Id. at 135. 
40 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659–60 (2004). 
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“a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation 
and leave.”41 Emphasizing the intentionally objective nature of the test as distinguishing it from 
other contexts in which age was considered, Kennedy noted that the Court’s prior opinions 
involving the Miranda custody test “have not mentioned the suspect’s age, much less mandated 
its consideration.”42 Thus, he concluded, the state court was reasonable in disregarding the 
suspect’s age.43 Justice O’Connor wrote separately to point out that, while Alvarado’s proximity 
to the age of majority made the consequence of his juvenile status less clear, “[t]here may be 
cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the ‘custody’ inquiry under Miranda.”44 Justice 
Breyer’s dissent was more pointed: “Common sense, and an understanding of the law’s basic 
purpose in this area, are enough to make clear that Alvarado’s age—an objective, widely shared 
characteristic about which the police plainly knew—is also relevant to the inquiry.”45 Breyer’s 
dissenting view would gain favor seven years later, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.46 
B. First Amendment Touchstones: Protecting Children by Restricting Speech  
The Supreme Court considered a string of cases beginning in 1968 that involved the 
protection of children through free speech restrictions. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court 
                                            
 
 
41 Id. at 663. 
42 Id. at 666–67. 
43 Id. at 669. It is important to recognize that the Court’s role in reviewing Alvarado’s federal habeas claim under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was to determine whether the lower court decision 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. at 655 (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)). It was not the Court’s role to decide 
the underlying merits of whether Alvarado indeed was in custody for Miranda purposes.  
44 Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
45 Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
46 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to those under the age of 17.47 
Justice Brennan began his analysis by pointing out that the “girlie” magazines involved were not 
considered obscene for adults,48 but explained that “the concept of obscenity or of unprotected 
matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed.”49 Given 
that “[t]he well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State’s constitutional power 
to regulate,”50 he noted that the Court must uphold the law if it was “not irrational for the 
legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”51 
Brennan notably brushed aside any concerns over the lack of studies linking obscene material 
and harm to children: “[T]he growing consensus of commentators is that while these studies all 
agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has 
not been disproved either. We do not demand . . . scientifically certain criteria of legislation.”52 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized the thrust of the Constitution’s 
First Amendment protection: “a society of free choice” that “presupposes the capacity of its 
members to choose.”53 Accordingly, he found the restriction permissible since “at least in some 
precisely delineated areas, a child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed of that 
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”54 
                                            
 
 
47 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
48 Id. at 634. 
49 Id. at 636. 
50 Id. at 639. 
51 Id. at 641. 
52 Id. at 642–43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 649–50. 
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In 1975, the Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville invalidated a city 
ordinance that prohibited a drive-in theater from showing films containing nudity. 55 Justice 
Powell held that the ordinance impermissibly censored theater owners’ First Amendment rights 
by barring them from showing films with any nudity, “however innocent or educational,” if they 
could be seen in public places “where the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes.”56 
Although rejecting the city’s claim that the ordinance was reasonably aimed at protecting minors, 
the Court acknowledged Ginsberg’s “well settled” rule that a government entity may adopt 
tighter restrictions on “communicative materials available to youths than on those available to 
adults.” 57 The Court emphasized, however, that restrictions on disseminating protected materials 
to children are valid “only in narrow and well-defined circumstances.”58 Recognizing that the 
“First Amendment rights of minors are not ‘co-extensive with those of adults,’” the Court 
returned to a familiar theme: that the age of a minor is a “significant factor” in determining 
whether he or she “has the requisite capacity for individual choice.”59 
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Death is Different 
A series of cases beginning in the 1970s reexamined the constitutionality of the death 
penalty and laid a foundation for the Court ultimately to prohibit capital punishment for entire 
classes of defendants, including juveniles.60 Although the earliest of these cases involved adult 
                                            
 
 
55 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
56 Id. at 211–12. 
57 Id. at 212 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629). 
58 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212–13. 
59 Id. at 214. 
60 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which stopped short of eliminating the death penalty 
altogether, but—recognizing the uniqueness of the sentence—deemed all capital punishment schemes then in 
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defendants, they form a backdrop to the Court’s continued juvenile jurisprudence. This period 
saw the first official appearance of the oft-cited “death is different” mantra,61 along with a steady 
insistence on individualized sentencing.62 As the Court stated in Woodson v. North Carolina: 
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and 
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense 
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse 
frailties of humankind.63 
A string of cases that followed during this period emphasized that “individualized 
consideration” of all mitigating factors was required before a death sentence may be imposed.64 
Applying this concept to the case of an Oklahoma defendant sentenced to death for a 
murder committed at age 16, the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma observed the “considerable 
history reflecting the law’s effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent 
and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.”65 While 
vacating the Petitioner’s death sentence because the trial judge considered only his age as a 
mitigating factor—but not his family background or mental and emotional development—the 
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
existence “cruel and unusual.” The Court voted 5–4 to overturn the death sentences in Furman and its two 
companion cases, but could not reach a common rationale; each of the nine justices wrote his own concurrence or 
dissent. Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional across the board, while the 
other concurrences (Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White) focused on arbitrariness and racial discrimination in the 
sentences. See id.; James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2007). 
61 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that Furman recognized “that the penalty of death is different 
in kind from any other . . .”). Gregg was one of five cases released on July 2, 1976, that resurrected capital 
punishment as a viable punishment. See Liebman, supra note 60, at 28–33. 
62 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
63 Id. at 304. 
64 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (requiring the jury to consider “any 
mitigating circumstances,” including “the characteristics of the person who committed the crime”); Woodson, 428 
U.S. at 304 (“consideration of the character and record of the individual offender [is] . . . a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death”) (citation omitted). 
65 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982). 
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Court discussed several unique qualities of youth that continue to inform its decisions.66 
“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may 
be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage,” Justice Powell began.67 Citing a 
pair of task force reports on juvenile crime, justice, and sentencing, he noted that teens “are more 
vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults,” and that they “may have less 
capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.”68 Pointing to the 
existence of separate criminal court systems for juveniles in every state, Powell commented, 
“Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier 
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.”69 
Six years later came another milestone in the Supreme Court’s juvenile jurisprudence. In 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality of the Court overturned the death sentence of a minor and 
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of a defendant 
convicted of a murder committed before the age of sixteen.70 The case was notable in the number 
of briefs filed by outside organizations seeking a voice in the development of the court’s 
                                            
 
 
66 Id. at 115–17. 
67 Id. at 115. 
68 Id. at 116 n.11. 
69 Id. at 115–116 
70 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens announced the judgment of 
the Court in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice O’Connor concurred in the 
judgment only, based on the “considerable risk that the Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions 
would have the effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give the question the serious 
consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.” Id. at 
857 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). O’Connor thus concluded that defendants who committed their 
capital crimes before age 16 may not be executed under a statute (such as Oklahoma’s) “that specifies no minimum 
age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.” Id. at 857–58. 
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jurisprudence on juveniles.71 One of the nine amicus briefs filed in the case put the developing 
field of brain science front and center, marking an important step toward bolstering existing child 
development knowledge with physical evidence.72 The American Society for Adolescent 
Psychiatry’s brief detailed a clinical study of fourteen U.S. death row inmates who committed 
their capital offenses as juveniles.73 The study marshalled data from psychiatric, psychological, 
and educational tests—as well as a battery of neurological, neuropsychological, and 
electroencephalographic (EEG) examinations of the subjects.74 
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, once again reiterated many of the now-familiar 
hallmarks of childhood.75 In describing why juveniles’ “irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult,” he addressed adolescents’ not-yet-developed sense of maturity 
and responsibility; lower levels of “experience, perspective, and judgment” as compared to 
adults; vulnerability, impulsivity, and lack of self-discipline; and susceptibility to emotion and 
peer pressure.76 Acknowledging that the Court “already endorsed” the concept of juveniles’ 
diminished culpability as compared to adults who commit similar crimes, Stevens wrote that the 
                                            
 
 
71 Nine “friends of the court” submitted briefs in Thompson. Joan W. Howarth, current dean at Michigan State 
University College of Law, co-authored the amicus brief filed for Amnesty International. (Kevin W. Saunders, 
professor of law and the Charles Clarke Chair in Constitutional Law at MSU College of Law, was on brief for the 
petitioner.) By contrast, Westlaw research shows that only three organizations filed motions to file amicus briefs in 
Eddings v. Oklahoma three years earlier. 
72 Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Orthopsychiatric Association as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (No. 86-6169). The brief’s significance, however, 
may have been somewhat limited by its singular focus on brain dysfunctions that may have exacerbated “normal” 
adolescent behaviors in juvenile murderers—rather than on the more basic issue that juvenile murderers should be 
treated differently than adults simply because they are juveniles. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834–36 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
76 Id. 
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“basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation.”77 Nonetheless, he 
cited the summary of the study that formed the basis of the American Society for Adolescent 
Psychiatry brief: 
Adolescence is well recognized to be a time of great physiological and 
psychological stresses. Normal adolescents are distinguished from adults by their 
intensity and volatility of feelings, their poor tolerance of anxiety, their lack of 
awareness of the effects of their actions, their failure of self-criticism, and their 
difficulty appreciating the feelings of others. Our data indicate that, above and 
beyond these maturational stresses, homicidal adolescents must cope with brain 
dysfunctions, cognitive limitations, and severe psychopathology. Moreover, they 
must function in families that are not merely nonsupportive but also violent and 
brutally abusive. These findings raise questions about the American tradition of 
considering adolescents to be as responsible as adults for their offenses and of 
sentencing them to death.78 
Recognizing that the petitioner and various amici urged the Court to “draw a line” 
prohibiting the death penalty for any person whose capital offense is committed before age 18, 
the Court chose to stay within the bounds of the facts presented.79 Justice Stevens concluded by 
declaring the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment for those who commit their capital 
offenses at age fifteen or younger.80 
The Court found its opportunity to address the fate of older teens the following year.81 In 
Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court held that the death penalty was an allowable punishment for 
those who commit murder at age sixteen or seventeen.82 Eleven amici, including the American 
                                            
 
 
77 Id. at 835. 
78 Id. at 835 n.42 (citation omitted). 
79 Id. at 838. 
80 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion). Stevens drew support for his chosen line 
from the “near unanimity” among states in treating those under 16 as minors for purposes such as jury service, 
driving, marrying, purchasing pornography, and gambling. Id. at 824. 
81 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
82 Id. at 380. 
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Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, put forth their positions this time.83 Justice Scalia, who wrote 
the plurality opinion, turned down the petitioners’ “invitation to rest constitutional law upon [the] 
uncertain foundations” urged by “interest groups” and “various professional organizations” that 
presented “an array of socioscientific evidence concerning the psychological and emotional 
development of 16- and 17-year-olds.”84 Explaining that the public is the appropriate audience 
for scientific arguments as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, Scalia emphasized 
that “[t]he battle must be fought . . . on the field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle, 
socioscientific, ethnoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available weapon.”85 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, but flatly rejected the plurality’s suggestion that a 
proportionality analysis taking into account the defendant’s age while balancing the punishment 
against the defendant’s culpability is not relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry.86 
The Stanford dissent also took issue with Justice Scalia’s assessment of the appropriate 
scope of the Court’s inquiry and countered that “[t]he views of organizations with expertise in 
relevant fields . . . also merit our attention.”87 Turning its attention thusly—and with several 
citations to the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry brief—the dissent found “strong 
indications that the execution of juvenile offenders violates contemporary standards of 
                                            
 
 
83 Michigan State Law Dean Joan W. Howarth again co-authored a brief from Amnesty International. 
84 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377–78 (plurality opinion). 
85 Id. at 378. 
86 Id. at 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
87 Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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decency.”88 Sixteen years after Stanford, the dissent’s position would prevail when Stanford was 
overturned by Roper v. Simmons.89 
Stanford and events in the broader field of juvenile justice helped mobilize child 
advocates to build a stronger scientific foundation to support their arguments.90 The MacArthur 
Foundation, for example, established a Research Network on Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice, through which top psychologists, criminologists, academics, and attorneys 
conducted a decade worth of research on juvenile culpability and rehabilitation.91 The 
foundation’s work, together with other similar studies on child development and the juvenile 
brain, would help “reshape juvenile justice in America.”92 
II. BRAIN SCIENCE TAKES THE STAGE: FIVE RECENT CASES (2005–12) 
The cases described above broadly set the scene for a series of five high-profile Supreme 
Court decisions involving juveniles from 2005 to 2012.93 
These cases reflect an overall trend showing dramatic increases in the number of amicus 
briefs filed—and the number of “friends” filing such briefs—in high court cases over time.94 One 
study, for example, showed an 800% rise in the number of amicus briefs filed over a fifty-year 
                                            
 
 
88 Id. at 405. 
89 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
90 Robert G. Schwartz, Age-Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27-Fall CRIM. JUST. 49, 49 (2012). 
91 Id. 
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93 See cases cited infra notes 5–9. 
94 Adam Chandler, Cert.-stage amicus “all stars”: Where are they now?, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 4, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
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organizations in my most recent study, 348 filed two or more briefs, and 160 filed three or more. Five years ago, 
those numbers were 259 and 118, respectively.”). See also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence 
of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
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period from 1946 to 1995.95 While friend-of-the-court briefs were filed in only 23% of argued 
cases as of 1955,96 that number rose to 93% in the 2010–11 term.97 In the same period, the 
average number of amicus briefs per case also increased from fewer than one to nine.98 
Supreme Court justices and the legal community at large have widely diverging thoughts 
on the usefulness and impact of amicus briefs—some view them as valuable guidance, others see 
them as an unnecessary burden, and still others are critical of amici organizations as pursuing 
their own self-interests rather than the truth.99 While “clear examples of amicus influence on the 
high court are unusual,” it is apparent that justices are relying on amicus briefs “more than 
ever.”100 
This trend holds true with regard to the science behind the juvenile brain.101 As brain 
development science has advanced and scientific data supporting long-recognized general 
propositions about the fallibilities of youth have become more readily available (including via 
amicus briefs), the Court’s reliance on science has become more apparent.102 The following 
cases are illustrative. 
  
                                            
 
 
95Kearney & Merrill, supra note 91, at 749.  
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A. Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
In 2005, the Supreme Court took another opportunity to address the constitutionality of 
the death penalty for juveniles who committed capital offenses at age sixteen or seventeen.103 
Overturning Stanford—which upheld such sentences less than two decades earlier—the Court in 
Roper v. Simmons held that executing juveniles who commit crimes before the age of eighteen is 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.104 The decision was based on the general idea that such a 
punishment was disproportionate to the culpability of juvenile offenders, given their lowered 
capacity for mature judgment, vulnerabilities to external influences, and still-developing 
character.105 
The Court this time arrived at the bench armed with—and somewhat more receptive to—
a wealth of scientific data on juvenile brain development.106 Out of the eighteen amici curiae 
briefs filed in the case, two primarily focused on juvenile brain development science.107 Another 
six at least touched on the subject.108 To support its position that executing juvenile offenders is 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the American Psychological 
Association (APA) in its brief first presented evidence from behavioral studies showing that 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are “less likely to consider alternative courses of action, 
                                            
 
 
103 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 568–574. 
106 Id. 
107 Brief for the American Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Medical Association et al., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). 
108 This group includes briefs by the following organizations, all of which supported the respondent: the Juvenile 
Law Center et al., the American Bar Association, the Coalition for Juvenile Justice, the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al., and the Missouri Ban Youth 
Executions (BYE) Coalition. 
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understand the perspective of others, and restrain impulses,” and are more likely to engage in 
“heightened risk-taking.”109 The APA bolstered its position with neuropsychological research 
demonstrating that juvenile brains have not yet reached adult maturity, especially in the 
prefrontal cortex and rest of the frontal lobes—the portions of the brain that control the higher 
functions involved in decision-making.110 Thanks to recent advances in magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) and other technologies, the APA said, “a new window into the differences 
between adolescent and adult brains” had been opened.111  
The American Medical Association (AMA) in its brief similarly laid out data from brain 
research conducted after Stanford v. Kentucky.112 It began: “The adolescent’s mind works 
differently from ours. Parents know it. This Court has said it. Legislatures have presumed it for 
decades or more. And now, new scientific evidence sheds light on the differences.”113 The AMA 
presented detailed evidence showing that teens are more likely to take risks and more impulsive 
than adults, and that their brains do not mature until young adulthood.114 It also touted the 
benefits of “sophisticated and non-invasive brain imaging techniques” available through by MRI 
and other methods, stating: 
These imaging techniques are a quantum leap beyond previous mechanisms for 
assessing brain development. Before the rise of neuroimaging, the understanding 
of brain development in the days of Thompson and Stanford was gleaned largely 
from post-mortem examinations, which shed little light on how a live brain 
operates and how a particular brain develops over time, or “longitudinally.” Brain 
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imaging, in contrast, allows researchers to study how a live brain progresses 
longitudinally.115 
The AMA’s brief also emphasized the import of juveniles’ still-maturing frontal lobes 
and prefrontal cortex.116 The latter brain region, it explained, is “associated with a variety of 
cognitive abilities, including decision making, risk assessment, ability to judge future 
consequences, evaluating reward and punishment, behavioral inhibition, impulse control, 
deception, responses to positive and negative feedback, and making moral judgments.”117 It also 
is one of the last to mature, the AMA noted.118 Finally, the brief—whose co-author, the 
American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, submitted the science-based briefs in Thompson 
and Stanford—reminded the Court of the exacerbating effects of brain trauma, a dysfunctional 
family, and past abuse on a juvenile’s already-fragile psyche.119 
With Roper, the scientific stakes had increased. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
began his discussion of the differences between juveniles and adults by pointing to the science: 
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies 
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in 
adults and are more understandable among the young.”120 
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Recognizing the “objections always raised against categorical rules,” Kennedy noted that 
“a line must be drawn” nonetheless.121 Picking up where the Thompson Court left off, Kennedy 
extended the line for death penalty eligibility upward from age 16 to age 18—the same point at 
which “society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”122 With 
that, Stanford was overruled. 
B. Graham v. Florida (2010) 
Graham v. Florida followed five years later, continuing the path toward heightened 
leniency for juvenile offenders set by Roper and the earlier cases.123 Holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of crimes other than 
murder, the Court for the first time imposed a categorical prohibition on a sentence less than 
death.124 The case reinforced the idea that childhood—not just death—is different.125 
Once again, the Supreme Court looked to age and its associated qualities—along with 
available brain development studies—to justify its ruling for heightened protection of 
juveniles.126 In addition to its own research, the Court had briefs from twenty-two amici to 
consider.127 Those from the American Medical Association and American Psychological 
Association again squarely focused on scientific brain studies to support the position that life-
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without-parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders were unconstitutional due to 
biological differences between juvenile and adult brains.128 At least eleven more briefs on both 
sides of the issue addressed the topic in varying degrees.129 
Reiterating the “recognized developmental characteristics of adolescents” discussed in 
numerous earlier cases, the AMA again presented neuroscience research showing that juvenile 
brains are anatomically immature in areas that manage “higher-order executive functions such as 
impulse control, planning ahead, and risk evaluation.”130 This data, according to the 
organization, was at odds with two primary goals of punishment: retribution and deterrence.131 
Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, acknowledged the science in his 
opinion.132 Citing the AMA and APA amicus briefs, Kennedy noted that “[n]o recent data 
provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As 
petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”133 Based on juveniles’ greater 
capacity to change and the difference between homicide and non-homicide crimes, Kennedy 
                                            
 
 
128 See Brief for the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
129 These include briefs by the following organizations: Constitutional Jurisprudence, Educators, Juvenile Law 
Center et al., Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators et al., J. Lawrence Aber et al., the American 
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concluded that, “compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to 
kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”134 
Not surprisingly, the dissent took issue with the majority’s discussion of the science 
involved.135 “[E]ven if it were relevant,” Justice Thomas wrote, “none of this psychological or 
sociological data is sufficient to support the Court’s ‘moral’ conclusion that youth defeats 
culpability in every case.”136 Thomas—who would have left the sentencing decision to the 
states—found it “unacceptable” that the Court, “swayed by studies reflecting the general 
tendencies of youth, decree that the people of this country are not fit to decide for themselves.”137 
C. J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 
The next year, the Court again repeated its much-recited rule that age is a relevant 
factor—this time while revisiting the question that Alvarado left open regarding the proper scope 
of the Miranda custody inquiry.138 The focus in J.D.B. v. North Carolina again was on the 
historical assumption that “children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature 
judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”139 This 
case saw notably fewer amicus briefs than in the preceding two death penalty cases—only 
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139 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England). 
  
 
24 
nine.140 Although at least two focused on the “unique vulnerabilities of children” based on age, 
both were geared toward psychological—rather than neurological—evidence.141 
Such evidence was enough for the Court to find, once again, that children are different 
under the law.142 The Court held that “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the 
time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its 
inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.”143 In her 
analysis for the majority, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that “in many cases involving juvenile 
suspects, the custody analysis would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s 
age.”144 Such was the case here, where the juvenile was removed from his seventh-grade social 
studies class in order to be questioned at his middle school.145 To ignore his age in evaluating 
“objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children,” Sotomayor noted, would 
result in “absurdity.”146 
Here, rather than relying directly on the scientific data to underscore the majority’s 
decision, Justice Sotomayor opined that “officers and judges need no imaginative powers, 
knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and 
cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know 
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that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult.” 147 Based on such “common sense 
principles,” Sotomayor concluded that the observations regarding children in earlier cases 
“restate what ‘any parent knows’—indeed, what any person knows—about children 
generally.”148 With a nod to the underlying science, however, she added that “[a]lthough citation 
to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense 
propositions [that children are different than adults], the literature confirms what experience 
bears out.”149 
D. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011) 
Just eleven days after J.D.B., the Court decided a different type of case involving the 
protection of children.150 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court reviewed 
a California state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors.151 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, firmly established at the outset that “video games qualify for First 
Amendment protection.”152 Therefore, he noted, the restriction “is invalid unless California can 
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that it, unless it is justified by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”153 The Court found that the 
state failed to meet the standard.154 
                                            
 
 
147 Id. at 2407. 
148 Id. at 2403 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
149 Id. at 2403 n.5. 
150 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 2733. 
153 Id. at 2738. 
154 Id. 
  
 
26 
Detailed brain development science and other evidence was presented en masse to the 
Justices through thirty-two amicus briefs prepared by business organizations, child advocates, 
broadcasters, scientists, and others.155 Two amici presented brain science evidence supporting the 
state’s position that violent video games harm children.156 The non-profit organization Common 
Sense Media argued in its brief that the constitutionally significant differences between juvenile 
and adult minds—the same differences recognized by the Court in juvenile sentencing and 
interrogation cases—also are relevant to state policies aimed at preventing youth violence and 
promoting healthy development.157 The brief discussed studies showing that exposure to violent 
video games was “significantly related” to increased levels of aggressive behavior and 
aggressive thoughts, and likely to trigger “permanent changes” in the player’s personality.158 It 
continued by reiterating general neuroscientific findings about the incomplete development of 
the juvenile brain that were relevant in criminal law cases.159 
A brief by California senator Leland Yee—jointly filed with the California Chapter of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the California Psychological Association—similarly 
emphasized research on the harmful effects of violent video games on the juvenile mind.160 The 
brief compiled evidence that—in addition to increasing aggressive thoughts and behaviors—such 
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games can cause “antisocial behavior, desensitization, poor school performance and reduced 
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain.161 
Justice Scalia, nonetheless, was particularly critical of the science behind California’s 
argument: 
California relies primarily on . . . studies [that] purport to show a connection 
between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children. These 
studies have been rejected by every court to consider them, and with good reason: 
They do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively 
(which would at least be a beginning). Instead, “[n]early all of the research is 
based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and most of the studies suffer 
from significant, admitted flaws in methodology.” They show at best some 
correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world 
effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the 
few minutes after playing a violent game than after playing a nonviolent game.162 
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but was more willing to leave the door open for 
future reconsideration of the science.163 “There are reasons to suspect that the experience of 
playing violent video games just might be very different from reading a book, listening to the 
radio, or watching a movie or a television show,” Alito noted.164 He concluded that “the Court is 
far too quick to dismiss the possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the 
effects on minors of playing violent video games) may be very different from anything that we 
have seen before.”165 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer gave significant space to discussing the scientific 
support in favor of upholding California’s restriction on violent video games as constitutional on 
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its face.166 Unlike his fellow justices, Breyer found “many scientific studies that support 
California’s views,” including “cutting-edge neuroscience” studies showing causal evidence that 
playing such games results in harm.167 In Justice Breyer’s view, such evidence was sufficient to 
warrant deference to California elected officials’ determination as to how best to carry out the 
state’s duty to protect its citizens.168 
E. Miller v. Alabama (2012) 
Last year, the Court returned to its juvenile sentencing line of cases.169 In Miller v. 
Alabama, the Court this time faced two companion cases involving juveniles sentenced to life 
without parole for murders committed at age 14.170 
Twelve amici curiae briefs were filed in the case, with several of the Court’s old 
“friends” once again present.171 In its brief, the American Medical Association based its 
explanation of why juveniles ought to be treated differently than adults on a wealth of scientific 
authorities centered on the biological basis for juveniles’ lacking maturity.172 Again reinforcing 
the long-known behavioral science observations of the differences between children and adults, 
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the brief focused on “the neurobiological underpinnings for why adolescents act the way they 
do.”173 The AMA summarized the relevant science as follows: 
Brain imaging studies reveal that adolescents generally exhibit greater neural 
reactivity than adults or children in areas of the brain that promote risky and 
reward-based behavior. These studies also demonstrate that the brain continues to 
mature, both structurally and functionally, throughout adolescence in regions of 
the brain responsible for controlling thoughts, actions, and emotions. Together, 
these studies indicate that the adolescent period poses vulnerabilities to risk taking 
behavior but, importantly, that this is a temporary stage.174 
The AMA also presented data on a slightly different angle than was taken in earlier cases: 
research demonstrating that juvenile brains “tend to be more active than adult brains in regions 
associated with risky, impulsive, and sensation-seeking behavior and less active in regions 
associated with the ability to voluntarily control behavior.”175 
Justice Kagan wrote for the majority this time.176 Citing the APA brief and others, Kagan 
noted that the “evidence presented to us . . . indicates that the science and social science” behind 
Roper and Graham’s conclusions on juvenile development “have become even stronger.”177 
Justice Kagan reiterated findings from earlier cases that the “distinctive attributes of youth 
diminish the penological justifications” (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation) for such a harsh sentence.178  Such attributes, she noted, include “their immaturity, 
recklessness, and impetuosity,” as well as their unique capacity for change.179 
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Pointing to Roper, Graham, and other cases mandating individualized sentencing, Kagan 
concluded that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
before imposing the harshest” penalty now available for juveniles.180 While not ruling life-
without-parole sentences themselves unconstitutional for young offenders, Kagan drew the line 
at barring mandatory sentences that do not consider mitigating evidence, including age and age-
related characteristics.181 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a concurring opinion that suggests 
another possible line: one forbidding life without parole sentence (mandatory or otherwise) for 
juveniles convicted of felony murder.182 Breyer focused on Graham’s emphasis of the “twice 
diminished moral culpability” of “a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill.”183 
Pointing to psychological and brain science demonstrating that juveniles’ actions are less likely 
to show “evidence of irretrievably depraved character” than those of adults, Breyer noted that 
defendants lacking the intent to kill are “categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.”184  For such defendants, he concluded, “the Eighth Amendment 
simply forbids imposition of a life term without the possibility of parole.”185 
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III. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This section identifies and offers several reasons for the uniqueness of the odd case out of 
the group of five. It then continues with an overview of the many implications and questions left 
open by the five recent decisions. 
A. Which One of these Cases is Not Like the Others? 
With one notable exception during the period from 2005 to 2012, the Court continued to 
give juveniles greater Constitutional protection than adults, over the states’ arguments promoting 
equal treatment of adults and teens.186 In the odd case out, the state argued the other side—that 
children required greater protection—but again lost.187 Science seems to be one determining 
factor. 
In Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, the Supreme Court found the weight of the science 
sufficiently convincing to support its long-held notions of youth.188 Juveniles now are widely 
deemed “less guilty by reason of adolescence.”189 Scientific studies showing that children are 
less culpable and less able to understand the system—explicitly or otherwise—helped the court 
justify prohibiting the death penalty for those under age 18,190 rejecting life sentences for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders,191 holding that a minor’s age must be taken into consideration 
before imposing a life-without-parole sentence, and proclaiming that age is relevant in 
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determining whether a minor was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.192 As the Court succinctly 
stated in J.D.B., “children are not just miniature adults” and, thus, require different treatment 
under the juvenile law.193 
In Entertainment Merchants, a majority of the Court was not swayed by the science.194 
Given that the case involved a prohibition on a form of protected speech—violent video games—
the state had to clear the high strict scrutiny bar to win.195 The majority, however, found the 
studies unconvincing in their effort to link violent video game play with harm to children.196 
“The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters,” Justice Scalia 
wrote, “but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, 
and dangerous to try.”197 Scalia explained, “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution 
to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press . . . do not 
vary.”198 Thus, the state’s interest in protecting children from the “ever-advancing technology” 
yielded to competing First Amendment interests. 
Comments by the concurring and dissenting justices, however, suggest that 
Entertainment Merchants is not necessarily the end of the story. Justice Alito, joined by the 
Chief Justice, “question[ed] the wisdom of the Court’s approach” in his concurring opinion, but 
noted that he is “not prepared at this time to go as far as” the dissenting justices, Thomas and 
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Breyer.199 After describing the realistic imagery, interactive nature, sophisticated technology, and 
strong antisocial themes of the games at issue, Alito stated that he “would not squelch legislative 
efforts to deal with what is perceived by some to be a significant and developing social problem 
[if] differently framed statutes are enacted by the States or by the Federal Government.”200 Given 
this, and the views of the two dissenters, it appears that a door remains open to reconsidering 
whether a state can protect its children by restricting violent material, under the right set of facts. 
B. Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller: Is this the End of the Story? 
The remaining four cases discussed in Part II may give rise to as many questions as 
answers. It is clear that more cases will follow to shape the Court’s jurisprudence involving 
juvenile sentencing and confessions. 
In J.D.B., the dissent was quick to point out that the “ease and clarity” of Miranda’s 
application were threatened by the Court’s failure to give even “a word of actual guidance.”201 
The “limited departure from Miranda’s one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test,” according to the 
dissent, results in a new test that “will be hard for the police to follow, and it will be hard for 
judges to apply.”202 
Commentators have pointed out some practical grey areas left open by J.D.B.203 If a 
suspect’s age is an element of the Miranda custody analysis, at what age are Miranda warnings 
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required, and what exactly does a police officer do with a conclusion about a suspect’s age?204 
And does the Court’s reasoning in J.D.B. require consideration of the age of “an old person who 
might seem vulnerable”?205 Scholars have asked whether J.D.B.’s holding should be extended to 
other contexts.206 If a juvenile’s age is relevant to the “custody” issue, is it also relevant to 
whether an “interrogation” took place?207 Or to the question of whether Miranda warnings that 
were given to a juvenile reasonably conveyed his rights?208 And, considering the lessons learned 
thus far about child development, should a new bright-line rule be created that prohibits the 
custodial interrogation of a juvenile who has not yet had an opportunity to consult with 
counsel?209 Finally, how should age factor into an examination of a minor’s waiver of rights?210 
The trio of juvenile sentencing cases (Roper, Graham, and Miller) opened similar 
inquiries. Miller in particular has sparked significant questions.211 Scholars already are asking 
what exactly suffices for the “individualized sentencing” now required for juveniles convicted of 
homicide, whether the Court’s reasoning might apply to mandatory sentences for adult offenders, 
and whether long prison sentences that are “the practical equivalent” of life without parole are 
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permitted.212 State courts already are occupied by cases asking whether Miller’s rule banning 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles should be applied retroactively.213 
Commentators also are opining about whether Miller’s reach might be extended to prohibit the 
confinement of juveniles together with adults,214 and—given Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion 
in Miller—whether a juvenile convicted of felony murder can permissibly be sentenced to life 
without parole.215 
CONCLUSION 
Only time will tell what the future trajectory of U.S. Supreme Court juvenile 
jurisprudence has in store. However, history is a strong indicator that the Court will continue to 
look to brain science—and, thus, scientific data presented by its non-party “friends”—in cases 
involving juveniles. While the Court has broadly accepted the brain development science 
supporting less harsh treatment of juveniles under the criminal law (specifically with regard to 
confessions and sentencing), it appears that attempts to restrict violent speech in the near future 
will require some measure of direct scientific evidence of harm. And, although the available 
evidence was deemed inadequate in Entertainment Merchants, the Court seems to have left a 
door open to allow for future reconsideration under the right facts and given the ever-changing 
nature of the science. 
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